[Vo l. 98:1941 ment building in a poor section of the Bronx.3 Did race influence the officers' decisions to fire the fatal shots? Did the social class of Mr. Diallo or of the jury in Albany, to which the officers' trials were trans ferred, influence the decision to acquit the officers?4
In Los Angeles, a former officer with the CRASH5 Unit of the Los Angeles Police Department's Rampart Division has described, in ex cruciating detail, at least thirty police officers' repeated misuses of their authority in an impoverished area of predominantly Latino im migrants.6 The scandal, which the Police Department itself conserva tively estimates to implicate a staggering 120 cases, involved the shooting of unarmed people, conspiracies to put the innocent in jail, planting guns on suspects, and orchestrating the deportation of wit nesses to police abuses.7 Could such massive and flagrant abuses of police power have festered for so long if they had instead transpired in a white, middle-class neighborhood?
Even aside from their obvious political and social significance, these disturbing events raise questions of enormous constitutional moment. For if race, ethnicity, and class do in fact play a role in the enforcement of our criminal laws -if, for example, race-based stereo typing influenced the police officers' decision to fire on Mr. Diallo, or if the poverty and ethnicity of those victimized in Los Angeles con tributed to the lawlessness of the CRASH Unit and the numerous du bious convictions obtained as a result8 -then inquiry must also be di rected at the criminal justice system as a whole. From police, to juries, to prosecutors, and perhaps even to legislative bodies, the system be-gins to appear inimical to our core constitutional values. We would like to believe that our criminal justice system does more than pay lip service to the command of equality .. We would like to believe that everyone, whether black, brown, or white, and whether rich or poor, will be treated fairly. We would like to believe that the administration of criminal justice lives up to the pledge carved into the frieze of the United States Supreme Court building for all to see: "EQUAL JUS TICE UNDER LAW." But does it?
The thesis that America's criminal justice system institutionally discriminates along race and class lines is scarcely new.9 Yet, notwith standing the weight of this claim as it bears on the prQper functioning of a constitutional democracy, it has never been presented to the Su preme Court as such. However odd this may first appear, no decision of the Court has confronted head-on the staggering implications of such an unequal system in a society that aspires to egalitarianism. While the Court has, in the past, voided discriminatory school1° and electoral systems,11 the criminal justice system has largely escaped such scrutiny. The Court, of course, has considered challenges to specific procedures that disproportionately affect poor people and minorities, such as the failure to provide counsel to indigent defendants12 and backroom interrogations without benefit of counsel.13 It has also con sidered alleged racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty.14 But, as if granted immunity, the criminal justice system as a [Vol. 98:1941 whole appears to be the component of government that the Four teenth Amendment's commandment of equality left behind. 15 Constitutional litigation is often expressive of a sense of moral ur gency, alerting both the judiciary and society at large to government's failure to live up to the Constitution's promise. 16 The question, then, is why this sense of moral urgency has generally not attended judicial consideration of the criminal justice system? Does ingrained discrimi nation within the criminal justice system fall outside the limits of con stitutional jurisprudence? If so, are those limits inherent or by craft? And should we not consider whether, instead of being exempt from constitutional scrutiny, racial inequalities within the criminal justice system should actually receive especially careful attention?17
II. COLE'S PORTRAIT OF THE BLIND GODDESS
David Cole's No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System1 8 argues that the criminal justice "system's le gitimacy turns on equality before the law, but the system's reality could not be further from that ideal" (p. 3). As Cole sees it:
[T]he administration of criminal law -whether by the officer on the beat, the legislature, or the Supreme Court -is in fact predicated on the exploitation of inequality . . . . Absent race and class disparities, the priv ileged among us could not enjoy as much constitutional protection of our liberties as we do; and without those disparities, we could not afford the policy of mass incarceration that we have pursued over the past two dec ades. [p. 5] As this theme dictates, No Equal Justice amasses an impressive set of statistics and case studies to expose the fiction that police depart ments, prosecutors, juries, courts, and legislatures operate in race-and class-neutral fashion.19 No facet of the criminal justice system goes 15. This seems even more strange when one considers that the fair administration of criminal justice is a prominent concern of the Constitution generally and the Bill of Rights in particular, specifically the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. We discuss this point infra Section IV.B. 17. Although the book reviewed here addresses both race-and class-based inequalities in the administration of criminal justice, our focus in this Review is principally upon the question of race.
18. David Cole is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University, and an attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights.
unexamined or untarnished. The pervasiveness of race. and class bias produces, for example, spurious consent searches (pp. 27-34); pretex tual motorist stops based upon race-stereotyped profiling (pp. 34-41); woefully incompetent, overburdened, and underpaid defense counsel, even in capital cases (pp. 76-89); drug laws with markedly disparate ra cial impacts (pp. 141-46); and all-white juries resulting from selection practices that exclude minorities (pp. 115-23). Cole subjects all of these practices to unrelenting scrutiny. According to Cole, when they are challenged separately in litigation, the Supreme Court either looks the other way or acknowledges the mandate of equality with a wink and a nod while ultimately failing to enforce that mandate. 20 Cole offers several insights into how the Supreme Court's criminal decisions, especially those of the Rehnquist Court, have solidified the inequalities he identifies. He charges that " [b ] y exploiting society's 'background' inequality, the Court sidesteps the difficult question of how much constitutional protection we could afford if we were willing to ensure that it was enjoyed equally by all people" (p. 7). As an illus tration of this background inequality, Cole cites "a predominantly white Congress [that] has mandated prison sentences for the posses sion and distribution of crack cocaine one hundred times more severe than the penalties for powder cocaine" (p. 8). This mandate has had a disparate racial impact, since blacks constitute 90% of crack convic tions but only 20% of powder convictions (p. 8). Cole demonstrates that the sentencing law's impact on African-American defendants is discrimination based on wealth or class, see, e.g. , Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (" [T] his Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis."); San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 {1973) ("[A]t least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. "). While some of the inequalities on which Cole focuses concern race-based discrimination (like traffic stops of black motorists), others are inequalities that affect people of limited means (such as the inadequate representation generally afforded to indigent criminal defendants). In defense of Cole's approach, however, it might be pointed out that the Court has insisted that class-based discrimination is every bit as noxious as race-based discrimination. See, e.g. , Griffin v. Illinois, 351U.S. 12, 17 (1956) {plurality opinion of Black, J.) ("In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on ac count of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color."). Whether it has actually en forced this principle is, of course, another story -and Cole's book does a nice job of dem onstrating that the Court has not done a particularly good job of policing either race-or class-based inequality in the administration of criminal justice. While Cole could perhaps have been clearer in separating out race-based and class-based inequalities, one of No Equal Justice's principal themes is that these inequalities are so closely linked as to make it almost meaningless to draw an analytic distinction between the two. In any event, as stated above, our focus in this Review is principally upon racial rather than class inequities.
20. See, e.g., pp. 41-42, 73-76, 76-81, 158-61, 161-65; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 {1996) (upholding traffic stop of two black men despite officers' admission that they had no interest in enforcing traffic law) (discussed at pp. 39-40); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 {1987) (upholding Georgia's imposition of death penalty despite statistical evidence that de fendants charged with killin g white victims received death penalty eleven times more often than defendants charged with killing black victims) {pp. 132-41); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that black man seeking to challenge LAPD 's use of chokehold lacks standing) {pp. 161-63). [Vol. 98:1941 magnified by prosecutors' decisions of whom to charge. According to U.S. Sentencing Commission data, 65% of crack cocaine users are white;21 yet in 1992, 92.6% of those convicted for crack-related crimes were African American and only 4.1 % were white (p. 142). Cole also discusses the alarmingly high rate of black incarceration, showing that, if the nationwide incarceration rate for whites were the same as the rate for blacks, "more than 3.5 million white people would be incar cerated today, instead of 570,000, and we would need more than three times the prison capacity (and prosecution and court capacity) that we currently have" (pp. 151-52).
Such disparities in prosecution and incarceration have evaded con stitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, because challengers must prove that prosecutors, legislators, or jurors intended to discriminate, an almost insuperable obstacle.22 Cole argues that these disparities -regardless of whether invidious intent can be proven -threaten the very legitimacy of our criminal justice system. He therefore takes issue with those who, in Cole's words, "argue that as long as we can rid the criminal justice system of explicit and inten tional considerations of race, we will have solved the problem of ine quality in criminal justice."23
The statistics and anecdotes that Cole collects paint a startling por trait of a criminal justice system that -whether by design or notmetes out disproportionately harsh treatment to racial minorities, es pecially those who are also disadvantaged by poverty. This evidence makes it difficult to argue with Cole's thesis that racial justice cannot be obtained simply by "banning intentional racism from the system" (p. 10), at least as the Supreme Court has generally conceived of "in tentional racism." But what would be required for our system to achieve this equality ideal, or at least to move closer to it? Although Cole's book, as we shall explain, does not provide as clear an answer to this overarching question as one might like, his portrait of the criminal justice system strongly suggests that wholesale reevaluation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to criminal justice is in order.
The most compelling part of No Equal Justice is Cole's sharp-eyed analysis of how the federal judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, has facilitated and reinforced racial inequality that occurs at the 21. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 39, 161 {1995).
22. See infra, Sections III.B-C.
23.
Cole cites Randall Kennedy as exemplifying this view. P. 9. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 11 {1997) ("in the absence of persuasive proof that a law was enacted for the purpose of treating one racial group differently than another .. . courts should permit elected policymakers to determine what is in the best interests of their constituents.").
street level. Cole's thorough discussion of the jurisprudence around profile-driven stops and arrests is particularly troubling. Here, he pro vides a shocking list of traits judicially upheld as part of a drug-courier profile: for example, the suspect "acted too nervous," he "acted too calm"; the suspect "arrived late at night," he "arrived early in the morning," he "arrived in afternoon"; the suspect "made eye contact with officer," he "avoided eye contact with officer"; the suspect was "one of first to deplane," he was "one of last to deplane," he "de planed in the middle"; the suspect "traveled alone," he "traveled with a companion," and so on (pp. 48-49). Cole convincingly argues that, because "unguided discretion invites stereotyped judgments," such wildly expansive criteria are perfectly set up to "be used dispropor tionately against minorities" (pp. 51-52). He even points to cases in which courts have expressly held or suggested that stops will survive equal protection scrutiny even where race is a factor, so long as it is not the sole factor (p. 51 ). But the alternative to using race as a ground for suspicion, routinely stopping "well-to-do white people" in the same way that minorities are stopped, would result in "community pressure on the police to regulate themselves" (p. 54). the burden (pp. 94-95), there is little public pressure to raise or abolish these caps. 26 To make matters worse, Cole explains, the Supreme Court has constructed a test for proving ineffective assistance of counsel so de manding that it is "virtually impossible to meet."27 Cole catalogs ap pellate rulings upholding convictions of indigent defendants against claims of inadequate defense where counsel fell asleep, were intoxi cated, used cocaine, and even were absent during critical testimony at their clients' trials (pp. 78-81). Though the rich would not put up with such lawyering, the Court's decisions leave the poor with no alterna tive. As Cole concludes, " [f] or all practical purposes, [the poor person facing criminal charges] has only the right to be represented by an in dividual admitted to the bar" (p. 76). Perhaps the greatest irony is that, while Supreme Court precedent nominally requires appointment of a competent attorney, "when an attorney demonstrates competence and dedication to his clients, he can find it difficult to get appointed for precisely that reason" (p. 88). Cole describes cases in which expe rienced capital defense lawyers prevail in federal habeas proceedings, only to have state judges deny them the opportunity to represent their clients when the cases return for retrial (p. 88).28
Taken as a whole, Cole's book presents a vivid and unsettling pic ture of a criminal system that is failing to live up to its promise of equal justice, especially for racial minorities. He makes a convincing case that Supreme Court decisions have perpetuated these inequali ties, and that the public's lack of trust in our criminal justice systemparticularly in minority communities -can be traced to the Court's unwillingness to take on responsibility for policing racial discrimina tion in the administration of criminal justice.
26. There exists a rich body of social science literature documenting that, despite the decline of overt and conscious racism, there is still a vast racial divide on a variety of public 27. P. 78. Cole is referring to the standard articulated in Stri ckland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 {1984), which requires that the defendant show a "reasonable probability that the result would have been different" but for the attorney's deficient performance.
28. In one such case, an attorney from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund prevailed in a federal habeas proceeding, but was denied the opportunity to represent his client on retrial, when the case was sent back to a local judge in Fayette County, Georgia. P. 88 (citing Roberts v. State, 438 S.E.2d 90 5, 90 6 (Ga. 1994)). The explanation Cole pro vides for such alarming rulings is that "capable defense attorneys can make a trial judge's life difficult," p. 89, especially in capital cases. all of which insulate the criminal justice system from claims of race based discrimination.
While these cases help explain some of the persistent inequalities in the judicial system, there exists a larger and more dominant story.
The principal opinions clearing the way for systemic discrimination are not found in prosecutors' or defense attorneys' briefs. They are not bedrock law upon which the criminal justice system is built. The deci sions that Cole so critically describes, from Mc Cleskey to Armstrong, are instead the consequence of the misguided paradigm to which the Court has adhered -since at least the mid-1970s -in assessing claims asserting the denial of equal protection. Rather than examining whether a government entity as a whole has discriminated, the Court has insisted upon an inquiry that requires equal protection plaintiffs to ferret out individual, intentional discriminators. Put another way, the Court has insisted upon a "bad apple" paradigm instead of examining, to borrow a term from criminal procedure, whether the tree itself is poisoned.33
A. Uprooting the Poisonous Tree: Brown and Green Perhaps the most telling way to begin an examination of how we have reached the point where the criminal justice system could sys temically discriminate on the basis of race, yet remain impervious to Fourteenth Amendment challenge, is to ask this question: Why does 33. The term "fruit of the poisonous tree" was coined in Nardone v. Un ited States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) , and refers to the doctrine that evidence obtained as the result of illegal government action is "tainted" and should therefore be excluded.
[Vol. 98:1941 Brown v. Board of Education 34 seem so utterly irrelevant to a discus sion of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system? Or why, close to fifty years after that decision, does the question itself sound off-kilter?
The Court in Brown stated that it "must look ... to the effect of segregation itself on public education"35 to determine whether school systems were denying equal protection of law. The Brown Court, of course, did not rest its analysis on whether there were individual bad actors on school boards who intended to disadvantage blacks -al though it certainly could have chosen to rely on the intent of many segregationists to deny equality to blacks.36 Instead, the Brown Court focused on the fact that a system of separate public schools for blacks and whites "generates a feeling of inferiority" among black children "as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."37 The Court thereafter insisted, in Green v. County School Board, that school segregation fos tered by government must be eliminated "root and branch."38
On the surface at least, it would seem a short step to transport the precepts of Brown and Green to the criminal justice system, where the elimination of racial inequality would surely be no less essential. 39. See, e.g., Yancey Roy, Recent Cases Put Racial Profiling in Sp otlight, Gannett News Serv., Feb. 28, 20 00 , at ARC, available in LEXIS, News Library, GNS File ("Racial profiling is old news in the black community where it's often referred to as 'DWB,' driving while black."). A Lexis search of news stories found hundreds that have used the term "Driving While Black" over the past two years.
the law" upon policing practices that disproportionately target African Americans can only create a "sense of inferiority" among the group that is so targeted.40 And, following Green, the duty of law enforce ment agencies under these circumstances would be to eliminate the discriminatory practices "root and branch." B. The Paradigm Shifts: Keyes, Davis, and Arlington Heights One can perhaps argue with the conclusion that the social meaning of police stops that disproportionately target blacks is to stamp them as inferior. But what is surprising, at least at first blush, is that we have not even seen challenges following this line of argument. To un derstand why that is the case, it is necessary to look beyond the Court's decisions in the area of criminal justice. Doing so reveals that the Court's blindness to race-and class-based injustice within the criminal justice system is a product of the paradigm that the Court has relied upon in assessing equal protection claims in noncriminal cases. Explaining why the criminal justice system has not proven susceptible to such challenges thus requires inquiry outside the criminal justice system. Again, the Court's school desegregation cases offer the most fruit ful point of departure. Brown and its immediate progeny41 represent the zenith of the "poisonous tree" paradigm -the recognition that, irrespective of evidence regarding the motives of individual malefac tors, a governmental system may deny equality to a particular group through the sum of its operations. In these cases, the Court refused to accept formal equal treatment and absence of the intent to discrimi nate as proof that equal protection had been accorded; these opinions instead examined whether, on the whole, the effect of the school sys tem was to "deprive the children of the minority group of equal educa tional opportunities. "42
In the 1970s, however, the paradigm shifted. Even as the Court continued to require school boards to remedy their own intentional segregation, it retreated from its earlier emphasis on investigating the 
433 U.S. 406 (1977).
[Vol. 98:1941 finding that the pupil population in the various Dayton schools is not homogeneous, standing by itself, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a showing that this condition resulted from intentional segregative action on the part of the Board."45 The Court thereby refused to allow the federal judiciary to take re sponsibility for systems that produce or reproduce inequality, absent some intentional bad actor. To be sure, the Court's subsequent deci sions continue to echo Green's admonition that, where discrimination has been found to exist, government must eliminate it "root and branch."46 By the mid-1970s, however, this seemingly awesome obliga tion had been stripped of its original meaning. The Court had by then abandoned Brown's insistence on looking to systemic discrimination -assessing whether the tree had been poisoned so badly as to require its elimination root and branch. This denied the Green mandate much of its force since, in the Court's view, there was no longer any tree to uproot, but simply "bad apples" to be picked off.
This doctrinal shift actually is best evinced by the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis.41 In Davis, the Court upheld Washington, D.C.'s hiring practices for its police force. To get on the force, appli cants were required to take a qualifying test, which blacks failed much more often than whites. The Court rejected the argument that such a disparate impact on blacks was sufficient to show an equal protection violation. The Court stated that "[t]he central purpose of [equal pro tection is] the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the ba sis of race."48 Taking this statement on its face, it might seem that a system riddled with racial discrimination -like the criminal justice system that Cole depicts -ought to be an easy mark for a Fourteenth Amendment challenge. But the Davis Court followed this sweeping statement with a narrow definition of what would be considered "offi cial conduct discriminating on the basis of race.''49
Much has already been written on both sides regarding Davis's holding that it is a "basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."50 Whether or not one agrees that discriminatory purpose should really be considered a basic equal protection principle, what is noteworthy about Davis is the ab sence of any consideration of the actual dynamics by which discrimina tion takes place in connection with the workings of government. Questions about the nature of discrimination are not even raised. In stead, the Court in effect assumes the answers, citing as examples of official discrimination Jim Crow segregation in public schools or facili ties, the acts of individual government officers like prosecutors or jury commissioners in relation to particular cases, or a pattern of conduct by the same official. Neither identified nor acknowledged is the possi bility that official discrimination could also be revealed in the aggre gate of an entire system's functioning, through the conduct of a multi tude of government actors, operating in separate and distinct cases and very likely not even aware of each other's actions. Can there exist, for example, an ethos of pervasive racial discrimination throughout a gov ernmental system, perhaps owing to the same sorts of underlying dis criminatory attitudes among individuals, but undetectable if the in quiry is focused upon a single actor or incident?51
One year after Davis, the Court, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,52 even more conclusively ruled out, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, a thoroughgoing in vestigation into pervasive racial discrimination. There, the Court set out as probative sources of discriminatory intent a set of criteria incon sistent with a systemwide model of official discriminatory behavior. The Court abandoned any pretense of inquiring into the overall im pact of a system's functioning upon people of a particular race. In stead, the Court focused on criteria like "[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision," "[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence," "[s]ubstantive departures ... if the fac tors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached," or the "legislative or adminis trative history behind a particular official action"53 -criteria that sharply limited the field to a single event and to decisionmakers di rectly responsible for that unitary conduct. universities, absent a compelling justification. In Bakke, five Justices rejected a set-aside for minority applicants to U.C. Davis Medical School.55 They did so over the objection of four dissenters who argued that the goal of "remedying the effects of past societal discrimination" sufficed to justify race-conscious admissions benefiting minorities.56 Rejecting this view, Justice Powell, the swing vote, stated that race conscious university admissions could only be upheld if they satisfied "the most exacting judicial examination."57 By the late 1970s, then, the Court had not simply abandoned its en terprise of rooting out systemic discrimination, but had actually turned its attention to eliminating voluntary programs designed to uproot sys temic discrimination. Absent an explicit racial distinction or an inten tional bad actor, no equal protection violation would be found. So re structured, the Court's test for what counts as racial discrimination can rarely get past individual cases to be treated on their individual facts. criminal homicide cases in Georgia from 1973 to 1980. His investiga tors, using questionnaires sometimes as long as 120 pages, scrutinized police reports, parole board records, and prison files, ultimately cate gorizing more than 400 features of each case. Relying upon rigorous statistical analysis, Baldus and his colleagues sought to sequester those variables that accounted for which homicide defendants were receiv ing death sentences and, specifically, to determine the significance of race in the decisionmaking process of capital cases in Georgia. The study concluded that murderers of white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive the death penalty as murderers of blacks, even after controlling for more than 230 variables arguably responsible for the disparity. 5
9 What distinguished McCleskey's case from the typical case, therefore, was that it was not readily distinguishable. His fate was the fate of others convicted of murdering white individuals, and, instead of the result of one decisionmaker, it was the outcome of con scious and unconscious attitudes held perhaps by police, prosecutors, and even jurors in a multitude of separate cases. His story could not be seen in isolation; it was part of how the Georgia criminal justice sys tem regularly functioned.
The Court rejected the challenge, holding that "[a]t most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race."60 It noted that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system,"61 finding that
[i]n light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the [ crimi nal] process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defen dants ... the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally sig nificant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing proc ess.62
In a footnote, the only safeguards mentioned were constitutional bans against "prosecutorial discretion ... exercised on the basis of race," "prosecutor [ial] 
wide-ranging arguments that basically challenge the validity of capital punishment in our multi racial society, the only question before us is whether in his case, the law of Georgia was properly applied."66 If McCleskey's arguments regarding capital punishment are deemed too "wide-ranging" to be taking seriously by the Court, then the workings of the whole system can scarcely be considered a fit subject for serious constitutional review.
While the latter part of the Mccleskey opinion exposed the Court's underlying concerns, a recent disclosure of an internal memorandum authored by Justice Scalia is even more starkly revealing.67 Although Justice Scalia joined the majority, this memorandum reveals that he was just as aware as the dissenters of the staggering implications of the Baldus study -though, unlike the dissenters, he was unwilling to have the federal courts to take on the weighty responsibility of rooting out racial prejudice from the criminal justice system. As related by Edward Lazarus, a law clerk to Justice Blackmun during the term the case was decided, Justice Scalia stated in a January 6, 1987 memorandum following oral argument that "[s]ince it is my view ... that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof."68 These sentiments never explicitly made it into the majority opinion. But the message surely did: Even if systemic discrimination within our criminal justice processes exists, the Court must leave it untouched -as though the Constitution itself demanded that such discrimination remain invisible or, at the very least, be defined as something other than discrimination.
D. Racial Justice Through Darkened Glasses
Cole's illustrations serve to emphasize that the problem with ex isting constitutional doctrine, as constructed by the Court since the 1970s, is that it is structurally incapable of reaching racial discrimina tion where it is most pernicious, penetrating throughout the entirety of a system. As Justice Brennan observed in his McCleskey dissent, the Court's fear was precisely that ruling in McCleskey's favor would lead to "too much justice"69 -or, more accurately, that it would impose on the federal courts the awesome responsibility of uprooting too much injustice, a burden that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have been unwilling to take on, and perhaps believe the federal judiciary to be incapable of handling.70
What Cole does not say, but what his portrait of the criminal jus tice system reveals, is that the Court's equal protection methodology is the direct result of the paradigm constructed through Davis, Arlington Heights, and post-Brown school desegregation cases. The "too much justice" concern that Justice Brennan decried was not born in McCleskey. It is, rather, the product of the Court's decisions of the mid-1970s -particularly in the area of desegregation -that eschew a search for systemic discrimination and instead force equal protection claimants to identify with specificity the individual discriminators. As we have explained, the narrow approach that the Court has adopted in examining claims of inequality within the criminal justice system fol lowed from a doctrinal structure developed in noncriminal cases, which shielded bureaucratic processes that systematically disadvantage minorities from careful review. BRANCH, Jan. 1999, at 1, 2 ("The number of cases brough t t o t h e federal cour t s is one of t h e mos t serious problems facing them t o day."). He has expressed approval of measures t h a t limi t access t o cour t s by criminal defendants and prisoners, while at the same time decrying Congress's expansion of t h e federal courts' criminal docke t by federalizing more and more crimes. In his 1997 Year-End Report on the Judiciary, for example, the Chief Justice spoke of the Anti t e rrorism and Effective Dea t h Penalty Ac t and the Prison Li t iga t i on Reform Ac t , which limi t e d habeas procedures and prisoner civil rights ac t ions, as "promising examples of how Congress can reduce t h e disparity be t ween t h e resources and workload in t h e fe deral Judiciary withou t endangering its distinctive charac t er." William H. Rehnquis t , Th e 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1998, at 1, 2. In t h e same repor t , t h e Chief Justice chastised Congress for its repea t e d "desire t o fe deralize new crimes." Id.
[Vol. 98:1941 Viewed in this light, several other cases on which Cole focuses ap pear less remarkable than the cases that precede them. Take, for ex ample, Whren v. United States,11 in which a unanimous Court upheld the District of Columbia police officers' stop of two black men in a ve hicle, based on violations of the traffic code, even though the officers in question were barred from enforcing traffic laws unless they ob served an immediate safety threat.72 The men stopped had argued that the Court should construct a test that allows for inquiry into whether the stops were actually made based upon some ulterior motive. The Court, however, held that the officers' intent could not be used to es tablish a Fourth Amendment violation -even when the ostensible reason for the stop is "actual and admitted pretext.m3 It proceeded to hold that the deviation from usual police practices cannot be used to show a Fourth Amendment violation.74 Instead, the Court articulated a bright-line "objective" test -namely, whether there is probable cause for believing there to be a violation of any vehicle code section.75
Cole is certainly correct to argue that the subtext to Whren, men tioned only briefly by the Court, is race-motivated stops. Whren had argued for a subjective intent test, in order to prevent those stops in which race is really what is motivating the stop. As Cole describes Whren, it stands for the proposition that even "a racially motivated pretextual stop is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment" (p. 39) .
While this characterization of Whren is technically accurate, the real story here is the two-part "divide-and-conquer" approach that the Court has generally adopted for issues of equality and liberty in the criminal justice system. First, as previously discussed, the Court has adhered to a constricting paradigm under the Equal Protection Clause that makes it almost impossible to show race-or ethnicity-based dis crimination, much less class-based discrimination.76 Except in that rare (and practically unheard of) case in which an officer admits that she or he made a traffic stop because of the driver's skin color, proving an equal protection violation is an almost unattainable task. Second, the standard that the Court has erected to determine whether liberty has been denied -in this case, the requirement that there have been no traffic infraction, even in cases in which this infraction was an "actual and admitted pretext" for the stop77 -makes it practically impossible to prove a violation. As Whren illustrates, traffic stops will survive 71. 517 U.S. 806 (1996 
Wh ren, 517 U.S. at 814 (emphasis omitted).
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, no matter how clear the evidence that the stop is pretextual, so long as there was a broken taillight, an unfas tened seat belt, or any other reason for stopping the vehicle.
Whren, therefore, is less significant than the Court's more general insistence on looking separately at claimed Equal Protection Clause and Fourth Amendment violations, instead of inquiring how these clauses might work together. The same is true of many of the other areas of the criminal justice system that Cole describes. For instance, in examining the composition of juries, the Court has separated out the equal protection and "fair cross section" requirements, rather than examining how these requirements might work together. As Cole points out, "prosecutors should always be able to proffer some race neutral reasons for their [peremptory] strikes" (p. 122). It does not require an unusually savvy prosecutor to come up with such a ration ale and thereby to rebut a claim that equal protection has been denied. So, too, in the area of punishment, the Court separates out the "cruel and unusual punishment" requirement from the command of equal protection, thereby allowing punishment systems in which the race of the victim -and sometimes the perpetrator -bears profoundly on the punishment meted out.
Cole probably would not disagree with this assessment of the Su preme Court's view of race in the area of criminal law -in particular, that the federal courts' failure to address the race-and class-based in justices documented in No Equal Justice are the consequence of the constricting paradigm that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have generally embraced in considering matters of race. The next question, then, is what can be done to remedy this situation. Can the Court's blindness to race-and class-based injustices in the criminal system be cured, without wholesale reconstruction of the Court's equal protec tion methodology?
IV. A REsTORATIVE VISION
Cole does an admirable job of poring over statistical and anecdotal data showing persistent race and class disparities, a:p.d of connecting those disparities to individual decisions of the Supreme Court. While he makes a persuasive argument that several of these cases ought to have come out differently, and that our criminal justice system might look significantly different if they had, Cole does not endeavor to con nect decisions such as McCleskey to the constricting paradigm that the Court has adopted more generally with regard to matters of race. His decision not to do so is certainly understandable -after all , he al ready has bitten off quite a large topic as it is. But the consequence is that Cole's book fails to propose remedies that are up to the task of eliminating the race-and class-based inequities that his book so thor oughly catalogues. This laundry list of potential changes that can feasibly be accom plished is discomfiting not so much because it contains bad ideasindeed, most of Cole's suggestions would surely improve our present system -but rather because they appear wholly inadequate to ad dress the systemic race-and class-based inequities to which Cole de votes the first 180 pages of his book. Cole's recommendations are, moreover, strikingly disconsonant with the portrait of the criminal jus tice system that he so meticulously paints. Simply put, the remedies Cole proposes offer little hope of eliminating race-and class-based discrimination within the criminal justice system.
Cole argues that the "racial divide fostered and furthered by ine quality in criminal justice has contributed to a spiral of crime and de cay in the inner city, corroding the sense of belonging that encourages compliance with the criminal law" (p. 13). The factual predicate for this statement seems somewhat dated. Recent statistics show crime to be on the decline nationwide,78 even as the as the zeal to imp ose stiffer penalties on offenders continues unabated.79 But even assuming the truth of Cole's statement, the remedies that Cole offers at best deal with the manifestation of the illness, which Cole describes as a break down in our sense of community. The solutions do not, for the most part, deal with the underlying malady in a criminal justice system that fosters and furthers racial inequality.
B. Some Stronger Medicine
How might our criminal justice system be reformed so as to honor the constitutional commandment of equality in the area of criminal justice? While Cole describes at great length various inequities in our criminal justice system as presently constructed, he does not provide an overarching theory of what our ideal should be.
To borrow the title from a recent book on the Constitution and criminal procedure, one written from a very different perspective, it would benefit us to return to constitutional "first principles " in con structing this ideal. Consistent with this approach, Amar has argued elsewhere that the "very meaning" of the rights embedded in the original Constitution was "subtly redefined" by the Civil War Amendments. 83 As an exam ple, Amar describes how the Fi rst Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech was refined by the Fourteenth Amendment's concern with racial equality: "The 1866 redefinition changed the central purpose and optimal 'due process' implementation of freedom of speech, Such a failure to combine "first principles" of the Bill of Rights and the Equal Protection Clause contributes to the Supreme Court's fail ure to recognize inequality in the criminal justice system. That failure can, as we have explained, be traced to the narrow approach it has generally taken in assessing equal protection claims. But whatever the faults of this approach, taking the command of equality seriously in the area of criminal justice would not necessarily require a wholesale 84. Id. at 1282. 85. Carol Steiker, "First Principles" of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Mistake?, 112 HARV. L. REv. 680, 690 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 80). Steiker also persua sively argues that Amar fails to apply the principles he preaches. For example, she points out that, in First Principles, Amar "underplays the extent to which constitutional criminal procedure really is and should be about race, class, and equality." Id. at 693. Although Amar's earlier article, Th e Bill of Rights and the Fo urteenth Amendment, see Amar, supra note 83, argues in favor of an approach to the Bill of Rights that focuses on racial equality, First Principles generally eschews such an approach.
86. See Amar, Th e Bill of Rights and the Fo urteenth Amendment, supra note 83, at 1282 (arguing that " 'freedom of speech' was subtly redefined in 1866"). revision of the Court's Equal Protection Clause methodology. In stead, it would require a recognition that the command of equality has special weight in cases in which rights protected by the Bill of Rights, including those that apply to the criminal justice system, are impli cated.
In addition to the practical realities on which Cole focuses, there is textual, historical, and theoretical support for an approach that gives special attention to the command of equality in the area of criminal procedure. The rights of criminal defendants were, of course, a domi nant concern of the Framers of the Constitution, provisions protecting these rights being embedded in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, not to mention the Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, and Habeas Corpus Clauses. Even more important, concerns regarding the equal implementation of state criminal laws were a dominant con cern at the time of the Civil War Amendments. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were especially wary of southern states de nying newly freed blacks through unequal administration of the crimi nal laws.89
Even aside from constitutional text and history, there are compel ling theoretical reasons for the approach we urge. To the extent one views the purpose of constitutional law as correcting deficiencies in maj oritarian democracy,90 claims of race-and class-based inequality in the criminal justice system have special force, for two complementary reasons. Fi rst, as Cole points out, if there is any group that is specially disadvantaged in the political process, it is criminal suspects and de fendants (p. 139). Given the "widespread societal hostility" toward those accused of criminal activity, the legislature can hardly be counted on to eliminate discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system.91 Second, even apart from the Constitution's special sensitivity to the rights of criminal defendants, Cole's book makes a convincing case that the rights of racial minorities generally, and not just actual defendants, are implicated by the practices he documents. It is com munities perceived by law enforcement to be criminal in character that bear the brunt of these practices -from the numerous African- American motorists stopped by Maryland state police who may never meet one another, to the innocent Latino immigrants wrongly con victed and imprisoned as the result of the LAPD's pattern and practice of misconduct in the Rampart Division. Minorities in the criminal jus tice system are thus disadvantaged in their ability to protect their in terests in the political process, further supporting the conclusion that courts should exercise especially searching review of practices that disproportionately burden minorities accused or suspected of violating criminal laws.92
Of course, we need not all agree as a matter of constitutional the ory to reach the same conclusion. As Steiker points out, we can dis agree on how to interpret the Constitution -as, say, between histori cal and representation-reinforcement models -and still arrive at the same place: namely, that the provisions of the Constitution that pro tect criminal defendants should be construed, in light of the Four teenth Amendment, in a way that is particularly sensitive to racial in justice.
Seen in this light, Cole's focus on communitarian remedies (pp. 189-209) seems misplaced. Our real focus should be on reconciling egalitarianism and libertarianism -and, in particular, on how the liberty-protecting provisions of the Bill of Rights should be read so as to reinforce the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of equality.
C. Envisioning Justice: Th e Case of Race-Based Traffic Stops
Simply described, the approach we advocate is that, where substan tive rights protected by the Bill of Rights are at issue, courts should be especially attentive to racial discrimination. Taking this approach would be no small matter. It would require that the federal judiciary consider claims of those who have heretofore been denied standing, to reevaluate the evidentiary burden that those challenging discrimina tory practices must bear, and to absorb much greater responsibility for remedying inequality. As daunting as this might seem, we believe that the federal judiciary could take on greater responsibilities for securing equality in the area of criminal justice, without wholesale abandon ment of the equal protection methodology it has generally embraced in areas such as school desegregation. bodies cannot be trusted to remedy inequality, it is in the area of criminal justice. For this reason, we argue, it is ultimately the federal courts, the institution of democracy charged with protecting the basic rights of the unpopular and powerless, that must take responsibility in this area.
Of course, there may well be good reasons for generally abandon ing the bad-apple model -both in criminal and in noncriminal cases -in favor of an approach that considers the disparate impact of an entire system on racial minorities.93 But one need not accept such a far-reaching argument to believe that the Court should change the way it looks at claims of racial inequality in the criminal arena. As we have argued, a higher standard in this arena is justifiable, based upon the principle that race discrimination is especially noxious where constitu tionally protected liberties are at issue. How would this principle play out in practice? As an initial matter, it would surely prescribe a differ ent result in several of the Supreme Court decisions that Cole dis cusses. For instance, in McCleskey v. Kemp , it would have required that the Court consider the interplay between McCleskey's Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Confronted with compelling evidence of systemwide racial disparities in the application of the most severe penalty possible, the Court might have shifted the burden to the state to come up with a race-neutral explanation for this disparity. In Un ited States v. Armstrong, our approach would have re quired the Court to consider the interplay between the Fifth Amend ment right to "due process," the Sixth Amendment right to "compul sory process for obtaining witnesses in [the accused's] favor," and the Fourteenth Amendment right to "equal protection." What Armstrong was demanding, after all, was simply that the prosecutor be required to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation of the basis for the statistical disparity in crack prosecutions. Reading the liberty-and equality protecting clauses of the Constitution together would have compell�d the Court to give Armstrong the discovery needed to assess whether, consciously or unconsciously, the United States Attorney's office was in fact engaging in systemic race-based discrimination in deciding whom to prosecute.
But the principle we identify would not simply call for more searching review of practices having a disparate racial impact. Our approach would also require reevaluation of existing constitutional doctrine in at least three respects: (1) assessing who has standing to bring challenges demanding systemic reform, (2) determining the evi dentiary standards applied to decide whether there is racial discrimina tion in the enforcement of criminal laws, and (3) crafting judicial remedies for systemic discrimination in the administration of criminal justice. Without revising each of the subj ects that Cole's book covers, we shall attempt to illuminate this approach by focusing on race-based traffic stops by police.
93. As our discussion in Part III supra suggests, we would favor such a revision.
Standing to Sue
Ensuring nondiscrimination in traffic stops and other seizures re quires, as an initial matter, reconsideration of the rules that the Court has adopted for determining who gets into court. One of the problems that frequently bedevils civil rights lawyers seeking to reform even the most egregious police misconduct is finding anyone who has standing to seek injunctive relief. As it has done in other areas of criminal law, the Court has set the bar for standing so high that it is often unreach able, making it practically impossible for private plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief.
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,94 for example, the Supreme Court held that an African-American man seeking an injunction against the LAPD's use of the chokehold lacked standing. Although Lyons had allegedly been subjected to a chokehold without provocation, the Court held that he could not show "any real or immediate threat that [he] would be wronged again,"95 since he could not show an imminent threat that the LAPD would again use the chokehold on him personally. A recent en bane decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Lyons to preclude plaintiffs from obtaining injunctive relief for alleged racial discrimination in traffi c stops. More recently, in Ro dgers-Durgin v. Lopez, Latino plaintiffs sued to stop the United States Border Patrol's alleged "systemic violations of the Fourth Amendment" resulting from its practice of stopping people of "Hispanic, Latin, or Mexican appearance."96 The court held that the named plaintiffs could not show a "sufficient likelihood" that they personally would be stopped again, and that, absent "a likelihood of injury to the named plaintiffs," no equitable relief could be issued on behalf of the class they sought to represent.97
The Court's standing doctrine poses an awesome barrier to law suits challenging police practices, especially given Lyons's statement that, to seek equitable relief against a government entity, one must show that "all police officers" in a jurisdiction "always" engage in the purportedly illegal practice with those they encounter and that the ju risdiction "ordered or authorized police officers to act in such man ner. "98 Our approach would demand that courts treat claims of dis criminatory traffic stops under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment with the same solicitude with which they have treated claims under the First Amendment. the Court has broadened generally applicable standing rules, in recog nition of the special problems posed by state action that has a chillin g effect upon protected speech. 99 It has allowed First Amendment chal lenges to practices that burden protected speech, by those whose speech might itself be unprotected. 100 The Court has justified this ex ception to normal standing rules as "strong medicine" that is required because the "First Amendment needs breathing space."101
Giving the same breathing space to the Fourth Amendment rights of minority motorists warrants comparable expansion of standing doc trine. Even if ordinary standing rules would require motorists to dem onstrate a likelihood of being stopped again, as Ro dgers-Durgin held, motorists who have been stopped in the past should be granted stand ing to pursue injunctive relief, whether or not they can prove that they are likely to be stopped in the future. Crafting broader standing rules in this context would recognize the importance of protecting minority drivers who are not before the court, and who may refrain from driv ing into certain areas because of discriminatory police practices. At the very least, plaintiffs should be allowed into court where they allege a pattern and practice affecting a class of individuals whose interests they seek to represent. In this regard, First Amendment doctrine provides another apt comparison. As Justice Brennan explained, lenient standing rules in the First Amendment area can be justified by concerns that "persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions."102 By the same token, absent judicial intervention, black motorists not before the Court might be deterred from driving into areas where police are known for making race-based stops. Accordingly, as in the First Amendment context, unconstitutional practices might otherwise flourish, because, under ordinary standing rules, there are few if any people who can get into court to assert that their rights have actually been violated. Affected individuals may simply choose to avoid con frontation with authorities, rather than running afoul of the law and then taking their chances in court. 100. See id. at 957 (" [W] here the claim is that a statute is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment, the Court has allowed a party to assert the rights of another without re gard to the ability of the other to assert his own claims and with no requirement that the per son making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity. 
Evidentiary Standards
Recognizing the interplay between the liberty-protecting Fourth Amendment and the equality-protecting Fourteenth Amendment would also affect the standards applied in assessing whether the gov ernment has acted in a discriminatory fashion. As we have explained, equal protection doctrine has changed since the 1970s to require liti gants to demonstrate intentional discrimination on the part of some bad actor. In Whren, of course, the Supreme Court reminded us that the high standard it was setting to prove a Fourth Amendment viola tion did not foreclose plaintiffs from attempting to show "intentionally discriminatory application of laws [under] the Equal Protection Clause."103 But the limited evidence that Courts will consider in de termining whether there has been intentional discrimination, exempli fied in Davis and Arlington Heigh ts, makes this a nearly impossible task in most traffic stop cases.
A recent Ninth Circuit decision demonstrates the difficulties faced by civil rights litigants and by well-meaning courts addressing race based traffic stops, while at the same time suggesting how a revised ju risprudence of equality might look. In Price v. Kramer, the Ninth Cir cuit upheld a damages verdict on behalf of three young men (two black and one white) who were stopped by police officers in the City of Torrance, California.104 As in Whren, the plaintiffs asserted viola tion of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, including that the stop of their vehicle was made without any reasonable suspicion or probable cause.105 And as in Wh ren, the clear subtext is race. As the Ninth Circuit notes, only the two black men -and not the white man in the back seat -were visible to the officers at the time of the stop.106 The stop, moreover, occurred just after the young men had crossed into the City of Torrance, which is only 1.5% black, from the City of Los Angeles, which is majority non-Caucasian and 15% black.107 During the stop, one of the officers told one of the African-American young men: "You're not supposed to be here."108 But notably, no race discrimination claim was made (or at least none made it to trial), pre sumably because proving intentional race discrimination in such a case is a near impossibility, absent an officer who admits that the stop was based upon race.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the jury verdict on the illegal stop, con cluding that, in contrast to Whren, the evidence supported the conclu sion that there was no objectively reasonable basis for the stop.109 What is most noteworthy about the case, however, is not simply the absence of a race discrimination claim, but that the officers actually argued for reversal on the ground that the introduction of evidence at trial suggesting a racial motivation for the stop "unfairly prejudiced" the jury.11° Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Reinhardt rej ected the officers' argument, explaining that the evidence of racial bias was rele vant, because it tended to support the young men's version of events -namely, that there was no objectively reasonable basis for the stop, and that the officers' race-neutral explanations for the stop (a seat belt violation and a broken taillight) were untruthful. The Ninth Circuit also found the evidence of racial bias relevant to the question for pur poses of punitive damages.
Price v. Kramer is surely correct to conclude that evidence of racial bias is relevant to whether the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated. But it is not relevant merely because it tends to support the plaintiff s' version of events (namely that there was no objectively reasonable basis for stopping them) and their punitive damages. Courts should not have to apologize for allowing evidence of racial bias to come before a jury. Under the approach we advocate, the evi dence cited by the Ninth Circuit -including the racial compositions of the City of Torrance compared to the City of Los Angeles, the fact that the white passenger was not visible at the time of the stop, and statements like "You're not supposed to be here" -would be more than enough to make out a racial discrimination claim against the indi vidual officers, even in the absence of any explicit statement of racial animus.
Allowing such a claim to go forward would not require a drastic revision of current doctrine; it is in fact quite possible that, had the Price plaintiff s made an equal protection claim, they would have sur vived summ ary judgement as to the individual officers under current doctrine, based on the same evidence that was presented in support of their Fourth Amendment claims. But we would go further than this when claims of race-based stops are made. Plaintiffs should also be able to make out a prima fade race discrimination claim by showing a pattern of stops on the part of individual officers, or even of all officers in a Department. This evidence could be used to show that the De partment has a "policy or custom" of discriminatory stops, pursuant to which individual officers were acting.111 To make out such a claim, Even if standing and evidentiary rules were revised to allow for enhanced judicial attention to race-based stops, one might well won der about the judiciary's institutional capacity to craft adequate reme dies.113 After all, one might argue, forcing a school district to stop seg regating its students based on race provides, at least, a definable mandate. Even in McCleskey, had the racial discrimination argument prevailed, there is a readily apparent, albeit quite broad, remedy that the Court could have ordered -namely, that the death penalty be stopped in those categories of capital cases where race could be shown generally to affect the outcome. But race-based traffic stops might ap pear to present a different circumstance. After all, a police depart ment can hardly be enjoined from stopping all black motorists. How is a court to remedy, for example, a police department that, as a whole, is disproportionately stopping black drivers?
employees if an official "policy or custom" can be shown. Thus, in an equal protection chal lenge, establishing municipal liability would require a showing that the officers' discrimina tory actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. See, e.g., Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir. 1998) (to make out equal protection claim against munici pality, plaintiff must show a custom or policy resulting in constitutional injury to her); Na tional Association of Government Employees v. City Public Service Bd. of San Antonio, 40 F.3d 698, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1994) (to prove claim under § 1983 based on violation of equal pro tection, plaintiff must show that government agency "maintained an official policy or custom of discrimination"). In Price v. Kramer, the young men abandoned their claims against the City of Torrance. 200 F.3d at 1256. The opinion does not explain why these claims were abandoned or whether there had been any discovery regarding a policy or custom of race based stops on the part of Torrance police officers.
112. The Price plaintiffs apparently did not make a claim for injunctive relief, and it is almost certain that they would have lacked standing to do so under current doctrine had they tried. There is no indication in the opinion that the young men had been stopped before in the City of Torr<i.nce or, for that matter, that they had ever driven in the City of Torrance before the night of the stop.
113. This concern is prompted by Professor Evan Caminker's suggestion, in response to an earlier draft of this Review, that the real reason that the Court has avoided the approach we advocate may be the diffi culty in judicially constructing a viable remedy for some types of systemic discrimination in the area of criminal justice. This may well be correct, although, for the reasons explained in the remaining text of this Section, we believe these difficulties to be surmountable.
We believe that the remedial problems of the approach we advo cate are actually less severe than they might at first appear. As an ini tial matter, the recommendation we have made with respect to stand ing partially answers the problem of remedy -namely, that where it can be shown that a class of people is affected by a police department's discriminatory practices, named plaintiffs should have standing to seek equitable relief on the class's behalf, whether or not the individual plaintiffs can demonstrate that they themselves would be subj ected to that practice again.
But broadening the circumstances under which classwide relief can be obtained only addresses part of the problem. The more prominent difficulty is what relief a court can plausibly order to correct the class wide problem.
While perhaps superficially diff erent, the difficulties in rooting out race-based stops from a police department bear some similarities to the difficulties in rooting out the vestiges of discrimination from a once-segregated school system. The ultimate goal in the latter case is to move from a dual system to a unitary system that treats all students the same regardless of their race; the ultimate goal in the former is to move to a system that treats all motorists the same. At least two forms of remedy are apparent, one relatively modest and the other some what more drastic.
The more modest remedy would be for a court to issue an order prohibiting a police department from making traffic stops based upon the drivers' race (except in situations where they are pursuing a specifically described suspect), while at the same time requiring the department to keep statistics regarding the race and ethnicity of all drivers who are stopped. This statistical data could, in turn, be used to demonstrate whether the pattern of race-based stops has in fact ended. This is the approach constructed in a recent consent decree, the fi rst of its kind, reached between the United States and the State of New Jersey.114 As one New Jersey official explained, the idea behind this approach is simple: "If discriminatory treatment is made difficult to conceal, it will be unlikely to occur."115
The more drastic remedy, perhaps appropriate in the case of pro nounced or intransigent government discrimination, would be for the court not only to require the collection of data, but also to impose nu merical benchmarks on how many minority motorists may be stopped. This borrows from the remedy upheld by the Supreme Court in Un ited a period of time, the Alabama Department of Public Safety hire or promote a qualified black for every white hired or promoted, as a remedy for the department's recalcitrant pattern of discrimination.116 Taking the Maryland trooper example used earlier, the benchmark for black drivers stopped for speeding might be tied to the proportion of speeders overall who are black. For a specified period of time, a court might require Maryland to stop no more black speeders than wol!ld be expected in the absence of discrimination -or, failing that, to demon strate some nondiscriminatory reason for this continued disparity.
There can be no doubt that ending racial discrimination in traffic stops, not to mention other discriminatory law enforcement practices, would require the federal judiciary to shoulder a burden that it has so far been unwilling to take on. As in school desegregation litigation, federal courts would necessarily have to exercise ongoing supervisory responsibility to ensure that government entities eliminate discrimina tory practices like race-based stops "root and branch." But Cole's book demonstrates that such practices tear at the very fabric of our democracy, and that ending them is essential to restoring the public's trust -and especially the trust of racial minorities -in law enforce ment. The New Jersey consent decree provides at least some prece dent for how federal courts might execute their responsibilities in this area. We believe that, with some modifications to existing constitu tional jurisprudence, the federal judiciary is fully capable of bearing responsibility for uprooting systemic racial discrimination in the crimi nal justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
Constitutional law is the place where principles hit the pavement, where theories of justice must come to grips with rough-and-tumble reality. Cole is to be commended for reminding us that racial inequal ity in the administration of criminal justice strikes at the very founda tion of our government's legitimacy, for assembling a wealth of evi dence supporting the conclusion that people of color are not treated fairly, and for connecting street-level inequalities to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The evidence he collects and pres ents makes a compelling case that many of the Court's decisions in the area of criminal justice should have come out the other way -and that our society would be a great deal closer to the ideal of "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW" if they had.
Cole paints a vivid, if disturbing, portrait of a criminal justice sys tem that is a long way from making the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment a reality. He is surely correct to suggest that the lingering racial divide on matters of criminal justice, not to mention the wide spread distrust of the system within minority communities, can be traced to our collective failure to address systemic race and class ine quality. While the Court has generally turned a blind eye to such ine quality, criminal justice is actually the area among all others where the most searching constitutional scrutiny is warranted.
The weakness in No Equal Justice is its failure to step back and re consider overarching constitutional principles, including both those on which the Supreme Court has relied and those ·on which a recon structed jurisprudence of equality might rely. To be sure, there are dangers in focusing too much on "first principles."117 But while Cole's descriptions of both Supreme Court precedent and the evidence of race-and class-based inequalities are painstakingly presented, he does not diagnose the underlying malady in our constitutional jurispru dence that has resulted in the criminal justice system's failure to live up to its promise. Doing so would not only help tie his story together, but would likely improve Cole's prescribed remedies.
In developing a curative vision, our starting point is to remember that the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, and indeed of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, is not simply to end racial segregation. It is, rather, to take seriously our constitutional obligation to root out racial inj ustice within public institutions. This entails more than sim ply stopping individual malefactors who are too inept or indifferent to mask their discriminatory intent. Even more critically, it demands identification and reform of bureaucracies that systematically disad vantage racial minorities, through the actions of numerous, unidentifi able government actors who may or may not even be conscious of their own racial prejudices. The obligation to eliminate such inequalities carries special force where interests protected by the Bill of Rights, including those provi sions that protect the criminally accused, are implicated. No Equal Justice makes a compelling argument that fulfillin g this obligation will require much stronger medicine than the Supreme Court has pre scribed. It will require that the Court consider the interplay between the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of equality and the liberties guaranteed by the original Constitution. It will require that the fe d eral judiciary scrutinize and uproot practices that -whether or not the product of conscious discrimination -continue to deny equality to all people. And it will require all of us to recognize that public faith in the blind goddess of justice cannot be restored, as long as the sores that prevent her from seeing racial inequality are allowed to remain unhealed.
117. See Steiker, supra note 85, at 693.
